It started with a sick day, a spreadsheet literally called “My Passwords.xlsx,” and a colleague trying to help. It ended with a company accusing two former employees of federal computer crimes and trade secret theft.
The Third Circuit’s response? Nice try — but workplace policy violations aren’t hacking. Continue reading
A transit agency thought it had a clear-cut reason to fire an employee under its no-fault attendance policy. But a disputed call-out, followed by a retroactive FMLA approval, now means a jury gets to decide whether the termination was lawful. Continue reading
An onsite manager alleged race and sex discrimination, but the court never reached the substance of her claims. Why? Because she worked for a contractor—not the school network she sued. The case was dismissed.
Here’s what every employer who works with vendors, staffing firms, or third-party service providers needs to know. Continue reading
Employers, take note: vague safety concerns and “we did our best” no longer cut it. A recent Third Circuit opinion revived a religious accommodation claim from a firefighter who wanted to keep his beard for faith-based reasons. Applying the Supreme Court’s Groff v. DeJoy standard, the court made it clear: you can’t just trim around the edges of Title VII. Continue reading
Suppose an employee, an adherent of a religion you’ve never heard of, requests time off from work on certain religious observance days.
In a precedential decision issued on Friday, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals declined to reinstate a plaintiff’s trial court victory for FMLA interference, concluding that when he requested leave for migraine headaches, he did not yet have a serious health condition.
Back in the day, it could be difficult for a plaintiff claiming disability discrimination even to prove that they had a disability. Continue reading
I’ll go ahead and file this one under: “Ya think?”
But perhaps I’m getting out over my skis. So, let’s see what you think. Continue reading
A man walks into a job interview. Continue reading
Earlier this year, the Supreme Court ruled that an employee claiming discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 need only show that their employer treated them worse than someone else because of a protected characteristic such as race, gender, or national origin.
Last week, a federal appellate court hinted at some examples of when a plaintiff suffered “some harm” to a term or condition of employment, which would be enough to have a facially plausible claim of discrimination.
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